This article develops a model in which patterns in buy and sell volume, order imbalances, and expected price changes arise endogenously. The model covers cases in which the market maker is competitive and is a monopolist. Our resultsprovide an explanation for the existence ofpatterns in mean returns within the trading day and across trading days.
patterns within the trading day. Harris (1986) goes further to show that the shape of the intraday pattern depends on the day of the week. In addition to these intraday patterns, empirical research also has uncovered significant differences in expected returns measured across trading days. A good example is the so-called weekend effect, first documented by French (1980) and Gibbons and Hess (1981) . These studies show that the expected return earned on most stocks over the weekend is significantly negative. None of the traditional models of asset pricing predicts negative returns on a wide class of assets, and it is difficult to understand why investors should hold risky assets over the weekend when the returns on these assets are expected to be negative.
One can easily think of a number of reasons why the expected returns earned on assets may vary within the trading day and across days. The first potential explanation that comes to mind involves changes in risk levels. If, for example, it is riskier to hold securities in the morning than it is in the afternoon and investors are risk averse, then it is quite plausible that the average return earned in the morning will exceed that earned in the afternoon. Systematic changes in the level of risk can clearly produce systematic patterns in expected returns. It should be noted, however, that changes in the riskiness of securities do not explain the negative average returns over the weekend. In addition to changes in risk, settlement procedures may have systematic effects on measured expected returns. Given the existing settlement rules, these would only manifest themselves in returns measured across trading days and not in intraday returns. Another cause of variations in expected returns might be exogenously given fluctuations in order imbalances when a bid-ask spread is present.' In periods with an excess of buy orders, recorded transaction prices are more likely to be ask prices and therefore high. Conversely, in periods with an excess of sell orders, recorded transaction prices are more likely to be bid prices and therefore low. Expected returns measured from a period with an excess of buy orders to a period with an excess of sell orders will be lower than expected returns measured across periods in which no imbalances are present. If, for some reason, order imbalances occur systematically, patterns in expected returns are likely to emerge.
All of these explanations (changes in risk, settlement accounting, and exogenously specified order imbalances) rely on exogenously given nonstationarities in the environment. In this article we ask whether patterns in mean returns can arise endogenously in stationary environments, that is, in situations in which the defining characteristics of all periods are the same. We find that they can. Specifically, we develop a model in which the interactions among potentially informed traders, discretionary liquidity traders, and one or more market makers lead to patterns in expected price changes. These arise from an endogenously determined pattern of trading in which buy volume and sell volume are concentrated in distinct periods. As we argue in the conclusion, our model provides a possible explanation for some of the patterns in mean returns that have been discovered in the data and also yields some new empirical predictions.
In our model systematic patterns emerge because of the existence of privately informed traders. We show that market makers can alleviate the adverse selection problem introduced by the existence of such traders by inducing patterns in buy and sell volume and consequently in expected transaction prices. The basic intuition can be obtained by considering a greatly simplified version of the model. Assume that at the beginning of each trading day a group of traders can obtain some information that will become public only at the end of the trading day. All trading takes place through a market maker. Assume that with probability .5 the informed traders have positive information and wish to buy a unit of the asset; otherwise, they have negative information and wish to sell. If the market maker has a policy of only buying on even-numbered days and only selling on odd-numbered days, then the informed traders on average will be able to use their information only half the time. Thus, if the information is costly to obtain, informed traders may be discouraged from acquiring it, and this obviously benefits the market maker. There is, of course, a potential cost incurred by a market maker following this policy-he may lose by not being able to trade with uninformed liquidity traders who, say, want to buy on an even-numbered day. However, if a significant portion of the liquidity traders can wait a day to trade, then little trading with them may be lost and much may be saved by not trading with the informed. Note that the above "divide and conquer" policy produces an extreme order imbalance-only sell orders on even days and only buy orders on odd days-and also produces systematic variations in mean price changes from day to day as transaction prices move from the ask price on one day to the bid price on the next day and then back again to the ask price on the following day.
This example presents an extreme version of the phenomenon we discuss in this article. Our model includes one or more market makers who post bid and ask prices, and three types of potential traders: informed traders; nondiscretionary liquidity traders who, if they trade at all, must trade in a specific period; and discretionary liquidity traders who have some choice with regard to the time in which they trade. Whether any liquidity trader actually submits an order depends on the prices posted by the market maker. We show that, because of the adverse selection problem, the equilibrium terms of trade over time are set so that all discretionary liquidity buyers trade in, at most, one period, and similarly for discretionary liquidity sellers. If the expected number of informed traders is an exogenous variable, then it is possible that discretionary liquidity traders of different types trade in the same period or in different periods. With endogenous information acquisition, however, only the latter type of trading pattern is possible in equilibrium, and distinct periods of buy and sell volume concen-tration emerge. As in the example, this pattern serves to discourage information acquisition by potentially informed traders while giving liquidity traders more favorable terms of trade in a specific period.
For a discretionary liquidity trader to trade in a given period, his cost of trading in this period must be lower than his cost of trading in all other periods within the interval of discretion. The cost of trading for an uninformed buyer is given by what we call the ask commission. This is equal to the difference between the posted ask price and the expected value of the asset given public information. (Similarly, sellers pay the bid commission, which is equal to the difference between the expected value of the asset given public information and the posted bid price.) By lowering the ask commission, the market maker induces a more active buy market because more liquidity buyers choose to buy and also because informed traders are more likely to trade. Similarly, a decrease in the bid commission brings about more trade on the sell side of the market.
When the periods of buy and sell volume concentration are distinct, we obtain both patterns in order imbalance and in expected price changes. We define the bias of the price in a particular period as the difference between the conditional expected value (given public information) of the average transaction price in that period and the expected payoff of the asset given public information. Although the ask commission is lower in a period of concentrated buy volume, the fact that the buy volume is much larger than the sell volume leads to the result that the average transaction price in a period of concentrated buy volume is biased upward. Similarly, the bias in a period of concentrated sell volume is negative. This creates patterns in expected price changes.
It should be noted that all our results hold whether the market maker is competitive or a monopolist. Clearly, the extent to which a market maker faces competition from other market makers and from floor traders depends on the particular market conditions and may vary across exchanges and even over time.
2 In this regard it is reassuring that our results are independent of the number of market makers. (The proofs, however, are somewhat different for the case of one and multiple market makers, typically being more involved and complex for the case of a monopolist market maker.)
The result that patterns in expected price changes arise in equilibrium may seem particularly surprising in the context of a model with a competitive, risk-neutral market maker. For example, in Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , Kyle (1985) , and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) , transaction prices form a martingale, so that expected price changes are zero. The source of the martingale property in these models is the zero expected profit assump-tion, together with the assumption that each price is set contingent on the precise number of trades that will take place at this price. In the model of this article, prices are set before the actual number of trades is realized.
[This assumption is also made in Easley and O'Hara (1987) .] Because the order flow is correlated with the future payoff of the asset, due to the potential presence of informed traders, the expected profit calculation is different from that of the bias in the price. Uneven patterns in expected price changes can then arise, even in the case of a competitive market maker.
The article is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the basic model and the equilibrium concept. Section 2 discusses the equilibrium of the basic model and its properties regarding patterns of trading volume and expected price changes. Similar analysis is presented in Section 3 for the model with endogenous information acquisition. Section 4 provides some concluding remarks and a discussion of the empirical implications of our model. All proofs appear in the Appendix.
The Basic Model 1.1 The financial market
We consider the market for shares of a single risky asset over T time periods. In the final period T the risky asset pays a liquidating dividend of F per share, where are independent and identically distributed with zero mean. We assume that δ has a continuous distribution which is symmetric around zero.
3 As in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) , δ, becomes public information prior to trading in period t. We define V t to be the expected payoff of the-asset conditional on all public information available in period t, that is,
In periods prior to T, shares of the risky asset are traded through the following trading mechanism. There are M risk-neutral potential market makers, where M ≥ 1. As in Easley and O'Hara (1987) , each potential market maker can set bid and ask prices in each period, with the interpretation that he is prepared to satisfy all the orders that he receives in a given period at the same bid and ask prices. (This trading mechanism is discussed in Section 1.4 below.) Let the bid price of market maker j in period t be and the ask price of market maker j in that period be We call the ask commission of market maker j in period t. Similarly, is the bid commission of market maker j in period t. The commissions represent the cost (to an uninformed trader) of trading with a particular market maker in a particular period. We will assume below that each potential trader knows in period 1 all the commissions and that will be charged in future periods.
Traders
There are a large number of potential traders. In each period each trader may either buy one share, sell one share, or not trade. All transactions of a particular type in a given period are executed at the lowest commission available in that period. We denote the lowest ask and bid commission by respectively. If more than one market maker posts the lowest commission, then each trader who wants to submit an order in that period determines randomly which market maker to trade with.
The number of potentially informed traders in each period t < T is a random variable with a mean of I > 0 for each t. Each of the potentially informed traders in period t has probability φ > 0 of becoming informed, independent of the number of other traders who become informed. (For now we take φ as exogenous, but it will be determined endogenously in the model of Section 3.) Thus, the expected number of traders who are actually informed in each period is φ. Α trader who is informed in period t observes the realization of the information that becomes public in the following period. 5 The assumption that private information is shortlived, that is, it becomes public after one period, greatly simplifies the decision problem of informed traders. We assume that each informed trader is risk-neutral but restricted to trade at most one share. This means that each informed trader in period t will submit a buy order if and only if equivalently, if and-only if The trader will submit a sell order if and only if or, equivalently, then informed traders do not trade in period t. 6 Another group of traders consists of what we will call nondiscretionary liquidity traders. These traders wish to buy or sell a share of the risky asset in a specific period t for exogenous reasons. Whether a liquidity trader actually submits an order depends on the prices posted by the market maker, or, more precisely, on the commission that the market maker charges.
7 Specifically, each liquidity trader v has a "reservation price" denoted by
This reservation price has the interpretation that if trader v is a nondiscretionary liquidity buyer in period t, then he submits a buy order if and only if where is the lowest ask commission in that 5 Our results would not change in any important way if each informed trader observes a noisy signal concerning even if traders observe diverse signals. 6 In the absence of the restriction that each trader trade at most one share, risk-neutral informed traders would have unbounded demands under the market mechanism we assume whenever The restriction that at most one share can be traded keeps the demand of the Informed traders bounded. Without this assumption market makers would suffer infinite losses whenever they transact with informed traders. Although a strict interpretation of the restriction is not realistic, it is reasonable to assume that the demands of informed traders are bounded as a result of risk aversion and capital constraints. Unfortunately, if either risk aversion or capital constraints are introduced explicitly, the model becomes intractable. We therefore use the trading restriction to approximate the effects of risk aversion and capital constraints.
period. Otherwise trader v does not trade in period t or in any subsequent period. Similarly, if trader v is a potential liquidity seller in period t then he submits a sell order if and only if
The reservation price can be thought of as the cost of satisfying the trader's liquidity demand using his best alternative to trading in the financial market considered here.
In addition to the nondiscretionary liquidity traders, there exists a group of liquidity traders who have some discretion over when they trade. Each of the discretionary liquidity traders learns of his liquidity demand and his reservation price in period T and may trade in any period prior to or at Like the nondiscretionary liquidity traders, each discretionary liquidity trader v has a reservation price which is independent of the reservation price of any other liquidity trader and has the same distribution as the reservation prices of the nondiscretionary liquidity traders. Each discretionary liquidity trader wishes to minimize the commission he pays to the market maker, subject to satisfying his liquidity needs and so that no more than the reservation price is paid as a commission. Thus, discretionary liquidity buyer v submits a buy order in period t if and only if (1) is the smallest commission in the interval . A similar strategy applies to discretionary liquidity sellers. If there is more than one period in which the minimal commission is posted, then each discretionary liquidity trader chooses randomly one of the periods with the lowest commission in which to trade. The number of nondiscretionary liquidity buyers and sellers in period tare identically distributed random variables with mean N > 0. The total numbers of discretionary liquidity buyers and sellers are identically distributed random variables with mean D > 0. We assume that the reservation commissions of liquidity traders (both discretionary and nondiscretionary) are independently and identically distributed with a continuous distribution over some interval [ a, b ] , where Our results do not require specific assumptions concerning the distribution of However, our proof of the result concerning the equilibrium pattern in expected transaction prices uses the assumption that the following random variables are distributed Poisson: the number of informed traders, the number of nondiscretionary liquidity buyers in each period t, the number of nondiscretionary liquidity sellers in each period t, the total number of discretionary liquidity buyers, and the total number 8 We assume that the windows of discretion (defined by periods are the same for each discretionary liquidity trader. See the concluding remarks of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) for some observations on how the results of models such as these might change if the intervals of discretion varied among liquidity traders. 9 Note that this tie-breaking assumption differs from Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) , where only pure strategies of liquidity traders are considered. Assuming that liquidity traders use a mixed strategy is natural in the context of the current model, but it is a problematic assumption in the context of the model in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) , since mixed strategies lead to a random number of traders, and the resulting order Bow is no longer normally distributed. Although we admit mixed strategies In the model here, as we show below all equilibria involve only pure strategies. We strongly suspect that this is also true for the model in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) .
of discretionary liquidity sellers. We also assume that these variables are mutually independent.
Equilibrium
We will focus on the time interval within which discretionary liquidity traders may trade. Because of the ability of discretionary liquidity traders to time their trading, the expected number of liquidity buyers and sellers in each period is an endogenous variable determined in equilibrium together with the bid and ask commissions. Let be the lowest ask commission over and denote by the expected number of discretionary and nondiscretionary liquidity buyers in period t. (Throughout the article the superscript A will identify variables related to the ask side of the market and the superscript B will identify variables related to the bid side of the market.) If is the number of periods in
We will call a sequence of expected liquidity traders a pattern of liquidity trading.
For our formal analysis of the equilibrium it is useful to define two functions. First let If the ask commission in period t is a t , then a potential liquidity buyer v trades in that period with probability
The expected profits of the market maker conditional on trading with a liquidity buyer at Thus, represents the expected profit of the market maker from trading with a potential liquidity buyer at a t . Similarly, G(b t ) is the expected profit of the market maker from trading with a potential liquidity seller if the bid commission is b t .
The second function we define relates to the informed traders. Let
[Note that since is independent of t. ] If the ask commission in period t is a t then the market maker's expected losses to an informed buyer, which are equal to the ex ante expected profits of an informed buyer, in that period are equal to To see this, note that an informed trader buys in period t if and only if
The market maker's expected loss to an informed trader conditional on the informed trader buying at commission . Since the probability of the informed trader buying at commission the market maker's expected loss to an informed trader due to allowing purchases at an ask commission of Similarly, the expected loss of a market maker to an informed trader on the bid side is when the bid commission is b t . The following lemma is intuitive.
To discuss how the equilibrium bid and ask commissions are determined, we need to distinguish two cases. The first is that of a monopolistic market maker ( M = 1 ), who sets the bid and ask commissions to maximize his total expected profits. The market maker's profits from trading at the ask commission a t , in period tare
Let
The monopolistic market maker chooses the ask and bid commissions Note that the objective function depends on the sequences of bid and ask commissions also through the dependence of on these sequences. Our assumptions so far do not guarantee that the existence of potentially informed traders affects the choice of bid and ask commissions by the market maker. In particular, let x* = argmax G(x), and suppose that x* lies outside the support of Then it is clear that the monopolistic market maker's optimal strategy is to set all the commissions equal to x*, since, given these commissions, no informed trader ever trades. To rule out this trivial solution we assume that x* is in the support of the distribution of This assumption guarantees that when there are potential informed traders, the adverse selection problem is important enough to affect the choice of bid and ask prices by the market maker.
In the second case We consider, there are at least two market makers. Here we seek a Nash equilibrium to the Bertrand-type game among market makers in which they simultaneously post sequences of bid and ask commissions. A sequence of commissions is an equilibrium if there does not exist another sequence of commissions which a market maker could post and which would lead to positive profits to that market maker, given that the other market makers continue to post their equilibrium commission sequences.
It is easy to see that in any equilibrium with at least two market makers, each market maker obtains zero expected profits on each type of transaction and in each period. This is a simple Bertrand result. Because the expected profits from trading at the ask for every market maker who posts the lowest ask commission in period tare proportional to we must have = 0 for every t, and similarly Moreover, the commission for each transaction is such that no lower commission can yield positive profits to any market maker.
10 Because we will be interested in the equilibrium commissions and in the patterns of trading that they induce, it will be convenient to refer to a single competitive market maker who sets these commissions under the condition that no other potential market maker can post prices that will yield the entrant positive expected profits.
A discussion of the trading mechanism
Recall that we assumed that the market maker processes all orders at the same bid and ask prices. This assumption differs in some significant respects from other models. For example, in Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , the trading process is strictly sequential-trades are processed one at a time, and after each trade occurs prices are revised to reflect the information content of that trade. On the other hand, Kyle (1985) analyzes a market in which many trades are batched together and processed at a price that is calculated to give zero expected profits to the market maker given the total order flow. In Kyle's model, prices are not posted but instead are determined after traders submit orders and the size of the total order imbalance is observed. The model of this article is similar to Glosten and Milgrom (1985) in that bid and ask prices are posted and traders know at which price they will transact. However, unlike Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , trading is not strictly sequential, since prices are not updated after every unit trade but only after every time period.
Our model can be viewed as a reduced form of a richer model. Each trading period in our model summarizes an interval of trading in the richer model. What is important to our results is that the market maker does not know precisely how many trades will take place at any posted price. This assumption captures a realistic feature of financial markets. For example, if trading involves multiple market makers (as in most over-the-counter markets), then it may be impossible for a market maker to set his prices contingent on how many shares trade at this price, since this may involve knowledge of whether other market makers are trading at the same time. Similar considerations apply if competition to the market maker comes from traders submitting limit orders (as in the NYSE). A trader who submits a limit sell order, for example, does not typically know at the time he submits his order how many shares will have been traded at or below his price if his order is executed, since he does not know how many trades will have been crossed on the floor and how many limit orders at or below his price will have been submitted.
It also seems realistic to assume that even if the market maker is a monopolist, posted prices do not respond instantly to the order flow [see, for example, Stoll (1985, p. 75)] . One possible reason is that the market maker has the obligation to maintain a fair and orderly market. This may involve an obligation to stabilize trading by keeping the posted prices valid for a limited interval of time and avoiding frequent changes in them.
Finally, it should be noted that the trading mechanism assumed here allows our model to be relatively simple and tractable yet enables us to model explicitly the decisions of various potential traders and of the market maker over time. In the context of our analysis other trading models are considerably more complex or intractable. For example, if trading is strictly sequential, then one generally encounters the possibility that more than one trader will submit an order at a given time. Presumably, in this case one order will be chosen at random to be executed. However, this introduces a possible winner's curse problem, because a liquidity trader is less likely to trade when informed traders submit the same type of orders. This complicates the analysis considerably. The other extreme is a market orders model such as that found in Kyle (1985) . One difficulty in following this approach here is that we must consider pricing functions that are nonlinear in the order flow. When the pricing function is nonlinear, the optimal orders for informed traders to submit are generally nonlinear functions of their forecasts of the final value of the asset. This means that the order flow need not be normally distributed, even if the informed traders' information signals are normally distributed. As a consequence, conditional expectation calculations become intractable.
Trading Patterns in the Bask Model

Concentration of trading
Let us call a pattern of liquidity trading admissible if there exists a sequence of ask and bid commissions that supports it in the sense that, given the sequence of commissions, the equilibrium trading behavior of discretionary liquidity traders indeed leads to the assumed pattern. (For example, an admissible pattern of liquidity trading can include at most two distinct values for because all discretionary liquidity buyers have the same strategy and the expected number of nondiscretionary liquidity buyers is constant over time.) The main result of this section is that the unique equilibrium pattern of liquidity trading is such that all discretionary liquidity buying occurs in, at most, one period and similarly for discretionary liquidity selling.
It is instructive to consider the limit case, in which there are no informed traders (i.e., φ = 0 or I = 0). If the market maker is competitive, then clearly the unique equilibrium commissions are all equal to zero. If the market maker is a monopolist, then it can easily be seen from Equations (5) and (6) that the optimal single-period commission simply maximizes G(x) in each period. In both cases the existence of discretionary liquidity traders does not affect the equilibrium commissions. Since by symmetry the equilibrium bid and ask commissions are equal both to each other and across periods, discretionary liquidity traders are equally happy to trade in any of the periods in Thus, the equilibrium pattern of liquidity trading is flat. The situation is different when there are informed traders, as we show in the next result.
The intuition underlying this result in the competitive case is as follows. A basic property of any equilibrium commission is that it is decreasing in the expected number of liquidity traders who will trade at the commission. This is because liquidity traders reduce the adverse selection problem, making it possible for the market maker to break even with lower commissions. It follows that any pattern in which discretionary liquidity trading is not concentrated cannot be an equilibrium, as a slight shading of the commission in one period would attract all the discretionary liquidity traders to that period and yield positive profits.
11 The only possible equilibrium is one in which all discretionary liquidity traders of each type trade in, at most, one period. Indeed, if the equilibrium commission in one period is set assuming all discretionary liquidity trading of the relevant type will be done there, then the relevant equilibrium commission in that period will be lower, so that such a pattern of trading is admissible.
If there exists then the market is open at least once for buyers and once for sellers, because it is possible for the market maker to break even at least in the period in which all the relevant discretionary liquidity traders trade. In this case the equilibrium commission for each type of trade in the period of concentration is the lowest solution to the zero expected profit condition. (The market may or may not be open in other periods.) If there does not exist x > 0 such that then there is no transaction type for which the market is ever open.
While the competitive market maker obtains zero expected profits on each type of transaction and in each period, a monopolistic market maker 11 The market maker who earns positive profits by shading the commission in one period and attracting all the discretionary liquidity traders to that period will not want to trade in those periods which these discretionary liquidity traders have abandoned. For these periods the quoted commissions will be too low given the new pattern of liquidity trading, and the market maker's expected profits will be negative if he trades. The deviating market maker therefore will want to adjust his commissions so that he does not trade in these periods. This he can do simply by raising his commissions In these periods above what the other market makers are charging. maximizes the expected profits over the whole time interval
. The fact that the monopolist considers profits across different periods distinguishes the analysis from that of a competitive market maker.
As part of the proof of Proposition 1 for the monopolistic case it is shown that the optimal single-period commissions have the same property as the equilibrium commissions in the competitive case, that is, they are decreasing in the expected number of liquidity traders. The intuition is similarthe presence of potential informed traders means that commissions are set higher than they would be set if only liquidity traders were present. An increase in the expected number of liquidity traders alleviates the adverse selection problem and therefore allows the market maker to set lower commissions.
Another property of the optimal single-period profit function that is used in the proof of Proposition 1 for the case of a monopolist market maker is its strict convexity in the expected number of liquidity traders. This implies that the market maker obtains lower profits from two periods with equal expected numbers of liquidity traders than he makes if he can allocate the liquidity traders to just one of the periods. Intuitively, with concentration of liquidity trading the market maker is able to predict better the composition of the set of orders and thereby avoid some trading with the informed.
The situation can be seen clearly in the limit case in which all liquidity traders are discretionary. In this case the market maker opens the market only once for sales and once for purchases. This has the effect of maximizing the amount of trading with liquidity traders and minimizing the amount of trading with informed traders. When all liquidity traders are discretionary the market maker does not lose any potential trades with liquidity traders, as they all trade in the period in which the market is open. With some nondiscretionary liquidity traders, it may not be optimal to close the market in periods in which discretionary liquidity traders do not trade. Nevertheless, in those periods the commissions are higher and there is less trading.
Proposition 1 and the intuition behind it are similar to the result in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988, Proposition 1) concerning the equilibrium concentration of trading in a model in which traders submit market orders and the market maker sets the price based on the total order flow. In both models there is more trading by informed traders in periods in which liquidity trading is concentrated.
12 Despite this, in both models the overall adverse selection problem is less severe when there are more liquidity traders, and this allows the terms of trade to be more favorable. These favorable terms attract discretionary liquidity trading, and this allows concentration to be the equilibrium pattern of trading.
Implication for patterns in volume and expected price changes
We first discuss the implications of Proposition 1 for the equilibrium patterns in trading volume. Let be the total number of buy orders submitted in period t and let be the total number of sell orders. It is easy to see that the expected value of is given by Clearly, is highest in period This is due only in part to the higher expected number of liquidity traders in this period (higher value of . Because the ask commission is lowest in period each potential liquidity buyer, whether discretionary or nondiscretionary, has a higher probability of buying in that period than in any other period. Similarly, each informed trader has a higher probability of trading. The expected number of buy orders from all types of traders is therefore higher in than in any other period. Similar considerations apply to the bid side of the market, where the expected number of orders is highest in period As already noted, given the assumptions made so far, we cannot predict which periods in will involve the concentration of trading. In particular, it is possible that and it is also possible that since the bid and the ask sides of the market are separate in the model so far. We will refer to the pattern in which as "time concentration," because trading of both types is concentrated in the same time period. The pattern in which will be referred to as "trade concentration." Note that in the case of time concentration there is on average no imbalance of orders in any period. Although there is one period in which both buy and sell volume is concentrated, symmetry and separability imply that the expected numbers of sell and buy orders in each period are equal. However, in the case of trade concentration there will be an imbalance of buy and sell volume. Specifically, the expected number of buy orders in is higher than the expected number of sell orders in that period, while the opposite is true in period (Of course, the total expected number of buy and sell orders over time is the same whether or not.) We now turn to expected price changes. First, we need to define the random variable which describes a typical transaction price in each period. This is an average transaction price constructed to take into account the random number of orders of each type. Formally, if (so there is some trading in period t ), we define
If
We are interested in the expected value of this variable given the public information in period t, summarized by Note that can have several interpretations. It can be viewed as the expectation of the average price of all transactions occurring in period t. It also can be viewed as the expectation of the price of the first (or last) transaction of period t, or it can be viewed as the expectation of the price of any randomly chosen transaction occurring in period t. We first have the following simple result.
This result says that under time concentration the price is never biased and all expected price changes, including those around the period of concentrated trading, are equal to zero. This is intuitive, given the symmetry and separability between the bid and ask sides of the markets in all periods. Although there is heavier trading in one period, the average transaction price is the same throughout. Consider now equilibria with trade concentration, that is, Note first that, as in Lemma 2, symmetry and separability imply that for we have [Note that this implies that, unlike what occurs in models such as Roll (1984) , the midpoint between the bid and the ask prices is not equal to V t , the "true" value of the asset based on public information at time t. ] As to expected transaction prices, we have the following result. We should note that this is the first result in the article which uses the assumption that the number of traders of each type is distributed Poisson.
While the price in periods other than is still unbiased, under trade concentration the price in period is biased upward in the sense that the expected price is strictly higher than the expected payoff of the asset, given public information. Note that if However, and this order imbalance is sufficient to lead to the result (shown as part of the proof of Proposition 2) that for (Recall that the increase in buy volume in is not only due to the higher expected number of liquidity buyers but also to the increased probability that any liquidity or informed trader will actually submit an order.) The same considerations apply to the other side of the market, with the consequence that the price is biased downward in Proposition 2 may seem surprising in light of the models of Kyle (1985) Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) , in which transaction prices form a martingale. As discussed in Section 1.4, the key difference between these models and the current one is that in setting the price the market maker in this article does not know the actual number of trades that will be executed at this price. As a result, the zero expected profit condition does not imply that transaction prices follow a martingale. To see this, recall that is the final payoff on the asset and note that the zero expected profits conditions in our model can be written as Because of the presence of informed traders who know are correlated with F conditional on V t . This means that the zero expected profit conditions do not imply that the bias in the price is zero as well.
Endogenous Information Acquisition
The main result
We now assume that the probability that any one of the potentially informed traders in period t actually becomes informed, is an endogenous variable. Specifically, we assume that potentially informed traders can spend resources in period t to increase the probability of becoming informed. In each period each potentially informed trader determines the amount of resources to spend on becoming informed in light of the expected profits they can obtain in this period and the cost associated with the probability of becoming informed.
14 If a potentially informed trader has a probability of becoming informed in period t, then his ex ante expected profits (calculated before he knows whether he will actually become informed) are given by We denote by the cost to each trader of having a probability φ of becoming informed in each of the periods. The following two assumptions will be used below.
Assumption 1 guarantees that there is an interior solution to the trader's problem, which is a smooth function of the parameters. Assumption 2 will only be used to prove the main result of this section for the case of a monopolistic market maker. It is not necessary for the case of a competitive market maker. Given Assumption 1, it is satisfied, for example, if
Consider now the decision of a potentially informed trader in period t. Recall that defined in Equation (4), represents the expected profits of an informed trader from a particular trade given that the commission for this trade is x. If the ask and bid commissions in that period are a, and b t , respectively, then the net expected profits of a potentially informed trader who chooses the probability 4, of becoming informed are Both the ask and bid commissions posted in a particular period now affect the expected number of informed traders trading in that period, and this greatly complicates the equilibrium analysis. In particular, since the expected profit of informed traders depends on both the ask and the bid commissions, the ask and bid markets can no longer be treated independently. The market maker's expected profit on either side of the market depends on the commissions posted on both sides. To see this define to be the optimal value of φ when the expected profits of an informed trader are y. Then the market maker's expected profits from the ask market in period t can be written as Obviously, depends on the bid commission b t . Similarly b t ) depends on a t . Our main result is that with endogenous information acquisition any equilibrium pattern of trading must exhibit trade concentration, that is, periods of buy and sell volume concentration which are distinct.
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15 It should be noted that we do not prove the existence of an equilibrium with a competitive market maker when information acquisition is endogenous.
ary liquidity buyers trade only in one period and discretionary liquidity sellers trade only in another period The same is true if the market maker is a monopolist if, in addition, c(·) satisfies Assumption 2.
The assumption that there exists x such that D)G(x) ≥ 0 guarantees that the adverse selection is not so severe that no markets can be opened, in which case no trading takes place. The argument for why there can no longer be equilibria that exhibit time concentration for the case of the competitive market maker is as follows. If all discretionary liquidity trading is concentrated in one period, say then both bid and ask commissions must be strictly lower in than in other periods. This implies that the expected profits to an informed trader are strictly higher at than in other periods, and this encourages more investment in information acquisition. Given this, another market maker (call him the entrant) can offer a slightly lower ask commission in another period, say t'. Because the bid commission in period t' is higher than in period , the expected profits to an informed trader are lower in period t'. This in turn means that there is less information acquisition in period t', and the lowered losses to informed traders translate into positive expected profits to the entrant.
The intuition is more complicated for the case of a monopolistic market maker. Consider the limit case in which there are no nondiscretionary liquidity traders. A similar argument to that used to prove Proposition 1 shows that it is not optimal for the market maker to open the market more than once for each type of trade, that is, once for buyers and once for sellers. Thus it remains to show that a strategy which implies time concentration cannot be optimal. Define [Recall that is the optimal value of φ when the expected profits of an informed trader are y.] Then the market maker's profits in each period t as a function of the commissions can be written as Note that in the model of the previous section, where is fixed, S(·) is linear [see Equations (5) and (6)]. However, as we show in the proof of Proposition 3, Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that S(·) is strictly convex. This implies that the market maker is worse off if informed traders have a relatively large expected profit in one period and a relatively small expected profit in another than if they have an intermediate level of expected profit In each of the two periods. The former occurs with time concentration, while the latter occurs with trade concentration. The monopolist therefore prefers trade concentration and
Implications for patterns in volume and expected price changes
We know from Proposition 3 that when information acquisition is endogenous, the equilibrium pattern of trading must exhibit trade concentration, that is, there are two distinct periods, such that discretionary liquidity buyers trade only in period and discretionary liquidity sellers trade only in period Clearly, if and the opposite holds if . This implies that the expected buy volume is strictly larger than the expected sell volume in period so that there is on average an order imbalance in favor of buy orders. Similarly, the expected sell volume is strictly higher than the expected buy volume in period .
Turning to the expected transaction price, the same arguments that were used in the proof of Proposition 2 give the following result:
Proposition 4. Consider the model with endogenous information acquisition.
Recall that in the basic model, where the probability is exogenous, symmetry and separability between the bid and ask sides of the market implied that if Thus, in periods during which no discretionary liquidity traders trade, the bid and the ask commissions are equal. This is not necessarily true in the model with endogenous information acquisition. To obtain some intuition, consider the limit case in which all liquidity traders have a reservation commission of 0.5, and suppose the market maker is a monopolist. If information acquisition is exogenous and then either or both the bid and the ask markets are closed. However, with endogenous information acquisition, the market maker may earn higher profits by closing one side of the market and charging a commission of 0.5 on the other than he earns charging a commission of 0.5 on both sides. By opening only one side he may discourage information acquisition sufficiently to more than compensate for not trading with the liquidity traders on the closed side of the market. The possibility that implies that order imbalances and patterns in expected price changes may arise even if there are no discretionary liquidity traders. The presence of discretionary liquidity traders guarantees that they do arise.
Concluding Remarks
We have developed a theory of endogenous patterns in buy and sell volume and in expected transaction prices. The basic intuition underlying our results on trading patterns is that "divide and conquer" pricing rules, which induce liquidity buyers and sellers to trade in different periods, mitigate the adverse selection problem faced by a market maker. As in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) , all the patterns identified here arise endogenously, because the various parameters of the model were assumed to be constant, over time and symmetric with respect to the bid and ask sides of the market.
To simplify the analysis of the pricing process under competitive and monopolistic market makers, we have made a few assumptions that may seem restrictive. It is important that we consider how our results might be affected if these assumptions are relaxed. The assumptions we wish to focus on concern the nature of the private information and the trading mechanism.
Our model assumes that private information is short-lived, that is, an informed trader has exactly one opportunity to trade on the information before it becomes public. If information is valuable for many periods, then results concerning patterns of trading are still available, but the analysis should take into account the behavior of informed trader(s) over the life of the information. 16 In the context of our model the creation of distinct periods of concentrated buying and selling may not reduce the incentive to acquire long-lived information. To see this consider again the example presented in the introduction in which the market maker only buys on even-numbered days and sells on odd-numbered days. If private information signals were not publicly revealed until three days after they were privately observed, an informed trader could trade on his information with certainty no matter whether it were favorable or unfavorable. Thus, the odd/even policy of the market maker may not discourage information acquisition, Of course, the market maker could respond to the existence of private information having a three-day life by changing the length of his "divide and conquer" cycle. For example, he might alternate buying and selling on a weekly cycle rather than a daily one. This, however, might be a losing proposition for the market maker if liquidity traders were not willing to delay their trading for long periods of time. With very long-lived information the divide and conquer policy may be too costly to implement. In actuality most information is neither long-nor short-lived but has a random lifetime, that is, the time at which the information becomes public is uncertain.
17 When this is the case, informed traders gain from their information only if the information does not become public before they use it. A divide and conquer pricing policy can reduce the incentives to acquire costly information having a stochastic lifetime because the information may become public before the terms of trade are favorable to the informed trader. Unfortunately, the model we have analyzed is not tractable if private information has a random lifetime, and so the exact nature of the equilibrium is not known. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the intuitions obtained in this article for the case of short-lived information carry over to settings in which information has an uncertain lifetime.
We now consider the trading mechanism in our model. In most continuous markets the trading mechanism and the regulations governing trade can be quite complex. Many types of orders can be placed, for example, market orders, limit orders with numerous types of qualifications, market on close orders, etc. Obviously it is not possible to model in detail every aspect of the trading mechanism in an actual market. We attempted to capture the elements of the trading mechanism that seem most important for understanding patterns in mean returns. As we argued in Section 1.4, in actual markets prices are not set contingent on the exact realization of the order-flow quantity. The execution of a limit order, for example, cannot be made contingent on the precise number of shares that have been traded since the limit order was submitted. At the same time competing market makers cannot make their prices contingent on the amount of trading done by their competitors. Like Easley and O'Hara (1987) , our model assumes that market makers set bid and ask prices (equivalently, commissions) that apply to all orders submitted during the period. This, of course, is an extreme assumption.
A more realistic model is one based on something intermediate between the strictly sequential price adjustment model of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and the lack of adjustment posited here. Mean effects may emerge in such a model even if those posting prices are competitive and riskneutral, since, as we have already noted, the martingale property is based in part on the assumption that each price is set contingent on the exact number of trades that will take place at that price. We have not been able to solve a model in which prices respond imperfectly to the order flow. Solving such a model would require us, for example, to determine endogenously the sequence in which orders are placed-in Glosten and Milgrom (1985) the order-flow arrival process is specified exogenously. We can, however, conjecture how the divide and conquer pricing strategy would manifest itself in such a setting. The cost of trading a given number of shares at any moment would depend on the rate at which the price changes. The intuition behind our results suggests that there will be periods in which prices rise at a slow rate when shares are purchased but fall at a more rapid rate when shares are sold. These periods will be periods of concentrated buying-periods in which it is expected that discretionary buyers will be trading. The price rises little when shares are purchased in these periods because many liquidity purchases are expected. The price falls in these periods at a rapid rate when shares are sold because not many liquidity-motivated sales are expected, so that sales are more likely to be motivated by information. Similarly, there will be bid periods in which the price falls at a slow rate as shares are sold but rises at a rapid rate when shares are purchased. The difference between the trading costs associated with selling and with buying can be significant when prices respond to quantities and can be much larger than the bid-ask spread quoted at any moment in time. Consequently, the effect of a divide and conquer pricing strategy on the incentives to gather information can be large. For reasons of tractability, we have chosen to capture the asymmetry by assuming fixed bid and ask commissions that are permitted to differ. These commissions should not, however, be literally interpreted to correspond with the bidask spread quoted, at a particular moment.
The market maker plays an important role in the trading mechanism we analyzed. We should emphasize that a market maker is anyone who posts prices and stands willing to trade at those prices. Under this interpretation the role of market making is not necessarily limited to specialists on the NYSE or dealers in the over-the-counter market. Anyone who submits a limit order is a market maker under our definition.
18 Any trader committed to trading at a posted price faces the adverse selection problems resulting from the existence of privately informed traders that are the focus of this article. It might be asked why we have assumed that liquidity traders submit market orders and therefore pay a trading commission rather than submit limit orders and receive trading commissions. There is an important difference between a market order and a limit order: A market order is guaranteed to be filled while a limit order is filled only for certain realizations of the flow of market orders. For this reason, a trader who needs to trade may prefer a market order over a limit order. It must also be remembered that the commission received by the trader who places a limit order is compensation for the losses resulting from adverse selection. The liquidity trader who places a limit order faces these losses as does any other trader.
While our model explains the existence and the magnitudes of various patterns, it does not predict their exact timing. This is not surprising, because complete symmetry across periods was assumed. Predictions about the timing of patterns can only be made if there are exogenously given differences in the characteristics of the periods. Brock and Kleidon (1989) discuss a number of factors that cause the beginning and the end of the trading day to differ from other periods. For example, they argue that the risk of holding positions overnight when trade is not possible differs from that of holding them during the day when (virtually) continuous trading strategies can be followed. This may cause some traders to adjust their positions at the end of the day to account for the change in trading possibilities. The end of the day is therefore likely to be a period when the volume of nondiscretionary liquidity trading is high. Both the model in the current article and the one in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) suggest that periods with higher levels of nondiscretionary liquidity trading will be the periods in which discretionary liquidity trading clusters.
Brock and Kleidon (1989) also give reasons why there might be an imbalance between nondiscretionary liquidity buyers and sellers at the end of the trading day. They observe that there is a tendency for passive portfolio managers to trade at this time. This is a consequence of the fact that the performance of these funds is based on how closely the fund tracks a specified index. Because the value of the index is calculated using closing prices, passive portfolio managers can reduce the tracking error by trading at the end of the day. If their funds are growing, the managers will be buying more often than selling, and this suggests the possibility of 'an excess of buy orders at the end of the day. In the context of our model, if there is an excess of nondiscretionary liquidity buying at the end of the trading day, then this will be the period of concentrated buying in the divide and conquer equilibrium. The exogenous excess of buy orders will be reinforced by the endogenous effects of the pricing strategy.
In addition to discussing reasons for the variation in the volume of liquidity trading across the trading day, Brock and Kleidon (1989) also propose a model of specialist pricing behavior based on either capacity constraints or monopoly position. They predict that the bid-ask spread will increase at the beginning and the end of the trading day when either capacity constraints are binding or when the demand to trade is less elastic. In our model we have not assumed capacity constraints nor do we examine changes in the elasticity of demand of liquidity traders that would change the pricing behavior of a monopolistic market maker. At the same time the model of Brock and Kleidon (1989) does not involve trading by privately informed traders. To explain many of the observed intraday trading patterns, it may be necessary to incorporate all these factors in a model.
The notion that the end of the trading day is a period of concentrated buying is consistent with the documented end-of-the-day effect and the weekend (or Monday) effect. The average transaction price at the end of the day will be biased upward and this will cause expected price changes to be significantly positive when measured from, say, midday to the close, but smaller and possibly negative when measured from the close to the next trading period.
19 Exogenous considerations may also cause some periods to be periods of concentrated selling in our equilibrium. An example might be tax-induced sales at the end of the year, which would induce discretionary liquidity sellers to concentrate their trading in the last days of the year. This may provide a partial explanation for the well-known January effect.
20 Some evidence for this has already been put forth in Keim (1989) . He finds that closing prices in December tend to be prices at the bid whereas closing prices in the early part of January tend to be prices at the ask.
Our theory can be used to derive a number of cross-sectional predictions. For example, it is easy to see that the patterns in volume and expected transaction prices that arise in our model are more pronounced if the expected number of discretionary liquidity traders or the expected number 19 In their empirical study of the weekend effect, Keim and Stambaugh (1984) note that specialist-related considerations might explain the effect, and they attempt to test whether this is the correct explanation. They find that there appears to be a negative weekend return when returns are calculated using only bid prices or only ask prices. This would seem to be evidence against the explanation developed here. Note, however, that the data used by Keim and Stambaugh (1984) are closing prices, while the actual periods of concentration may not both coincide with the close. A related point is that if the distribution of Information releases in our model) is not symmetric, then it is possible that negative rcturns an be measured even when one looks just at bid prices or just at ask prices. This is shown in Admati and Pfleiderer (1989) . 20 For other models that attempt to explain the January effect, see Rock (1988) and Williams (1987) . These papers also provide references to the empirical literature on this topic.
of informed traders is higher. Also, the patterns are typically more pronounced when the market maker faces less competition. To the extent that it is possible to identify assets that are traded more heavily by discretionary liquidity traders (who might be large institutional investors) and to the extent that the degree of competition in market making is observable, these predictions are empirically testable. Some recent empirical studies have analyzed the intraday patterns in bid-ask spreads. For example, McInish and Wood (1988) show that the bid-ask percentage spread tends to be higher at the beginning and the end of the trading day than at other times. There are several problems involved in relating our results to the quoted bid-ask spread. First, expected payoff of the asset conditional on public information at time t, may not be directly observable, and this means that the bid and ask commissions may not be directly observable. Second, in the model with endogenous information acquisition there is no necessary relation between the sum of the bid and ask commissions and the trading pattern. In fact, it is possible that the sum of the bid and ask commissions is larger in periods of concentrated liquidity trading. Third, if we interpret the bid and ask commissions as representing more general costs of trading, as discussed above, then the quoted bid-ask spread is not an appropriate measure of the relevant trading costs.
Finally, it is interesting to relate our model to that of Glosten (1989) , which compares the liquidity of the market (as measured by the likelihood that the market is closed) under a competitive market maker and under a monopolistic market maker. Glosten shows that a monopolist market maker may open markets that a competitive market maker would close. Glosten's model involves the setting of a price schedule for various quantities by the market maker, and the source of his result is that the monopolist is able to profit from cross-subsidization between trades of different sizes while a competitive market maker is required to break even on each transaction (i.e., at each quantity). In our model trading only takes place in a fixed number of shares on each side of the market, so cross-subsidization across different quantities is never profitable. It is also possible to show that cross-subsidization across different periods does not arise in our model. Thus, the competitive market maker opens any market that the monopolist market maker opens. Moreover, Glosten's result may be reversed in our context-it is possible to construct examples in which a competitive market maker opens a market that a monopolist market maker does not. The reason for this is that, with endogenous information acquisition, by closing down one side of the market, the market maker makes it less profitable to collect information in that period, and this may increase the profits on the other side of the market. Appendix Proof of Lemma 1 Let and let H(·) be the cumulative distribution function for Then
Proof of Proposition 1
We first prove the result for the case of a competitive market maker. Assume that there are r > 1 periods in which, say, the discretionary buyers trade. Then the ask commissions in these r periods are equal and strictly smaller than the ask commissions in any of the remaining periods in Let a be the lowest commission. The competitive market maker's profits in each of r periods must be nonnegative:
Consider now an entrant who in some period in posts an ask commission of a All discretionary liquidity buyers will now trade in this period. The entrant's expected profits in this period are equal to Since both are continuous functions, the difference between (A3) and (A2) can be made arbitrarily close to for small enough positive is positive, the entrant makes positive profits.
This shows that there cannot be an equilibrium in which discretionary liquidity buyers trade in more than one period. We must now show that there is an equilibrium in which they do trade in the same period. Let a* be such that We know that a* exists since both are continuous and since and for some Let the competitive market maker post commission a* in some period It is clear that no entrant can earn positive profits by posting a commission less than a* in any period Thus, all discretionary liquidity buyers will trade in The argument for the bid side is identical. We now prove the result for the case of a monopolistic market maker. Consider the market maker's optimization problem in a single period, that is, the choice of bid and ask commissions to maximize II, (defined in Section 1.3), taking the pattern of liquidity trading as given. First note that the problem is completely separable with respect to the bid and the ask sides of the market. Thus, the optimal ask commission a, maximizes and the optimal bid commission maximizes We now turn to the optimization problem of the market maker over time, where the pattern of liquidity trading is endogenous. First note that Lemma A1 and the separability of the market maker's profits with respect to the bid and ask sides of the market imply that any admissible pattern of liquidity trading can be supported by a sequence of bid and ask commissions that are optimal in the single-period problem given the pattern. For example, if discretionary liquidity buyers trade in a period t but not in a period then from Lemma Al the optimal ask commission in period twill be lower than the optimal ask commission in period t', so that discretionary liquidity traders will indeed prefer to trade in period t rather than in period t'. This implies that the optimal sequence of commissions for the dynamic problem of the market maker will also be optimal single-period commissions given the pattern that is implied by this sequence of commissions.
Let be the optimal single-period profit function as a function of the expected number of the liquidity traders in that period.
The inequalities in (A9) and (A10) hold strictly since x cannot maximize the function for two distinct values of L. This is because the first-order conditions at the optimal x imply that Clearly, this cannot be satisfied at the same value of x for distinct values of L. Multiplying both sides of (A9) by a and both sides of (A10) by (1 -a) and adding the results gives Suppose that the market maker sets ask commissions so that the discretionary liquidity buyers may trade in different periods. (The analysis for sellers is exactly the same.) Note that the sequence of ask commissions has no effect on the profits earned on the bid side of the market and vice versa. Under our assumption there must be r > 1 periods in which the ask commissions are equal. Expected profits from trading 'at the ask price in these r periods are given by rQ(N + D/r), which by Lemma A2 is strictly lower than Q(N + D) + ( r -1) Q(N). Thus, profits will be greater if all the discretionary liquidity buyers trade in one period and similarly for sellers. From Lemma A1 it follows that this pattern of trading is supported by the optimal single-period commissions. s
Proof of Lemma 2
This proof and the proof of Proposition 2 use the following lemma:
Proof. If are identically distributed, then it is easy to show that If are distributed Poisson, the lemma follows from the fact that the distribution of conditional on is binomial with parameters It follows that which completes the proof. s Lemma 2 follows immediately from Lemma A3 and the facts that, as a result of symmetry and separability,
Proof of Proposition 2
We will prove the result for
The proof for is analogous. The following lemma will be useful in the proof:
The sum of the first two terms on the right-hand side of (A17) is equal to the market maker's expected profits on the ask side of the market, while the sum of the first two terms on the right-hand side of (A18) is equal to the expected profits on the bid. If the market maker is a monopolist, the first is clearly greater than the second. If the market maker is competitive, the first and second are both equal to zero. Since it follows that For the rest of the proof it will be convenient to denote F(x) Note that to be the event that informed traders purchase shares in period t, that is, be the event that informed traders sell shares in period t, that is, and to be the event that informed traders do not trade, that is, . The distribution of both conditional on each of these three events is Poisson. We have The first term on the right-hand side has been shown to be positive; the second must be nonpositive (if t -1 = then the second term is negative; otherwise it is equal to zero). This completes the proof of Part 1. Part 2 is completely analogous. s
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider first the case of a competitive market maker. We first show that discretionary liquidity trading must be concentrated. The argument is almost identical to that made in the proof of Proposition 1. Assume that there are r > 1 periods in which discretionary liquidity buyers trade. Let a be the common ask commission charged in those periods. An entrant can post an 'ask commission of for some in one of those periods and attract all discretionary liquidity buyers to that period. For sufficiently small the entrants' expected profits can be made arbitrarily close to D (1 -1/ r) G(a), which is positive. 21 We now show that equilibrium cannot involve time concentration. Suppose there exists an equilibrium pattern where both discretionary liquidity buyers and sellers trade in the same period be any other period in [T ', T"] . Because discretionary liquidity trading is concentrated in period
The expected profits of the market maker from trading at the ask in period are equal to
Now consider an entrant who posts (only) commission in period All discretionary liquidity buyers will now trade in period t' with this entrant. The entrant's profits will be For a small enough the difference between (A29) and (A28) can be made arbitrarily close to earns positive profits. This breaks the proposed equilibrium and thus shows that the equilibrium pattern cannot exhibit time concentration.
To prove the result for the case of a monopolistic market maker we will proceed as follows. Start with any admissible pattern . We will construct a sequence of transformations of this pattern. In each step of the sequence discretionary liquidity traders are reallocated to trade in different periods. We assume that, even if a pattern in the sequence is not admissible, the market maker can adjust commissions to maximize profits in each period. We will show that for any admissible pattern that does not involve trade concentration, there exists a sequence of transformations in which profits are at least as great at each step in the sequence as in the step before (and for at least one step strictly greater) and that the final pattern in this sequence is admissible. It will be clear, in fact, that the final pattern can be induced by commissions which are optimal in each period.
From Lemma 1 and the properties of c(·), the first term on the left-hand side of both (A33) and (A34) is nonzero for all a and b such that G(a) > 0 and G(b) > 0. Thus, the same pair (a,b) cannot satisfy either (A33) or (A34) for two distinct vectors (L A , L B ). Multiplying (A31) by a and (A32) by (1 -α) and adding the two inequalities shows that is strictly convex in the vector (L A , L B ), which implies also that it is strictly convex in each of its arguments. s Now consider any admissible pattern be the number of periods in which discretionary liquidity buyers trade and be the number of periods in which discretionary liquidity sellers trade. Let be the set of periods in which discretionary liquidity buyers trade and let be the set in which discretionary liquidity sellers trade. If , then . There are two cases to consider. Case 1:
By the convexity of we know that profits are increased by concentrating all discretionary liquidity buying in some period and by concentrating all discretionary liquidity selling in some period Thus trade concentration results in higher profits in this case.
Case 2: Choose one period and move all discretionary liquidity trading into this period. If commissions remain unchanged, then profits remain the same. If commissions are adjusted optimally for this new pattern, then profits increase (or at worst, remain the same). We will now show that profits can be increased by moving either the discretionary liquidity buyers or the discretionary liquidity sellers to some other period, t'.
The market maker's expected profit in period t* is where are the optimal commissions in period t*. Similarly, the market maker's expected profit in period t' is where are the optimal commissions in period t'. If profits can be increased by shifting either the discretionary liquidity buyers or the discretionary liquidity sellers to period t'. For example, then profits can be increased by shifting the discretionary liquidity buyers to period t'. then moving the discretionary liquidity buyers to period t' leaves profits unchanged. However, if the commissions in periods t* and t' are adjusted to be optimal for the new pattern of liquidity trading, profits increase. From the foregoing we can conclude that a necessary condition for time concentration to be optimal is that
We will now show that even if profits can be made higher by moving the discretionary liquidity buyers into period t'. Assume that We will require the following lemma:
In our case the function which gives the optimal probability of becoming informed as a function of the expected profits of an informed trader is defined implicitly by Differentiating this totally with respect to y and solving for gives Differentiating the identity again with respect to y we have Substituting Equation (A38) into Equation (A39) and solving for we find that Equations (A38) and (A40), together with the fact that imply that Equation (A37) is equivalent to Assumption 2. N ow suppose discretionary liquidity buyers trade in period t' instead of in period t*. If the ask commission in period t' is changed to a t* and the ask commission in t* is changed to a t' then the expected profits of the market maker in t* are and his expected profits in period t' are
The difference between the sum of Equations (A41) and (A42) and the sum of Equations (A35) 
and (A36) is
We want to show that this difference is positive. This will follow from the following lemma.
Lemma A7. Let x > b and y > a. If F(·) is a strictly convex function, then
Proof.
By the assumed convexity of F(·), we know that and Adding Equations (A45) and (A46) together gives the result. n Because by assumption a t* < a t' and b t* < b t' , we know that Thus, the arguments of S(·) in Equation (A43) meet the conditions of Lemma A7. The convexity of S(·) then implies that the difference is positive. Moving discretionary liquidity buyers from period t* to period t' increases profits.
To complete the proof we need to show trade concentration pattern is supported by the optimal commissions. This requires only that for But it is straightforward to see that it cannot be optimal to charge a lower commission in a period when there are N expected liquidity traders potentially trading than when there are N + D. n
